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Abstract Ahigh court has to decidewhether a law is constitutional, unconstitutional,
or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be inter-
preted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for univer-
sal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social
choice functions. Although in our setting the preferences are restricted to be single-
peaked over three alternatives, these problems persist. Runoff mechanisms are not
well-behaved either: they do not implement any Condorcet consistent social choice
function in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that
some Condorcet consistent social choice functions can be implemented in dominant
strategies via other simple and natural mechanisms.
Keywords Runoff voting system · Condorcet consistency · Strategy-proofness ·
Implementation theory
JEL Classification C72 · D71 · D78
1 Introduction
A constitutional court is a high court that verifies the constitutionality of legislation.
The judgments of the constitutional court consist of selecting one among the follow-
ing three alternatives: “constitutional” (the law fits in the constitution as it is written),
“interpretable” (the law is accepted as soon as it is interpreted in the proper manner),
and “unconstitutional” (the law does not fit in the constitution). In this setting, it is
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natural to think that the judges members of the court have single-peaked preferences
over the three alternatives, as the alternative “interpretable” cannot be bottom ranked
(because “unconstitutional” is to the opposite of “constitutional”).1
Normally, as a result of a consensus process, the alternative chosen by the constitu-
tional court has the support of an absolute majority of the judges. In some situations,
however, judges are unable to reach a consensus. The voting rule planned for these
situations is a runoff voting system: if no alternative wins a strict majority of votes
in a first round, the judges vote in a second round but only over the two alternatives
that previously got the highest support. Thus, in Spain, Articles 255 and 263 of the
“organic law of the judicial power” describe the voting procedure that shall govern
courts. In essence, these articles pursuit the majoritarian approval. According to Arti-
cle 255, judicial decrees and sentences should be approved by a majority of votes.
The judicial procedures do not admit abstention or blank vote. When a majority is not
achieved, Article 263 opt for a resolution of the conflict. Essentially, a second voting
round is held between the two positions with higher support in the previous voting
round. Similar voting procedures govern courts in countries like USA or Germany.
In this paper, we study whether the proposed runoff voting systems are successful
in selecting the alternatives that have more support among the judges, and we analyze
the extent to which other voting systems can be used to achieve this goal. In order to
carry out this analysis we use the principle of Condorcet consistency. This principle
requires selecting an alternative that cannot be defeated by majority voting in pairwise
comparisons by any other alternative. Such alternatives are known as Condorcet win-
ners, and the fact that judges’ preferences are single-peaked guarantees their existence
(furthermore, for some preference profiles, the Condorcet winner may not be unique).
We would like the alternative selected by the judges to be a Condorcet winner.
We may interpret runoff voting systems in two different ways, as social choice
functions or as a mechanisms. The first approach consists of selecting, for each possi-
ble preference profile, the alternative that would result in the runoff voting system if
all judges voted sincerely. It is known that, for preference domains larger than the one
analyzed in this paper, the runoff social choice functions have several drawbacks.2
We show that many of these problems remain in our domain of single-peaked pref-
erences over three alternatives. We prove that runoff social choice functions are not
Condorcet consistent; i.e., if all judges vote sincerely, the alternative selected by the
runoff voting system is sometimes such that a majority of the judges prefer the same
different alternative (Proposition 1). We also show that runoff social choice func-
tions do not satisfy strategy-proofness; i.e., they are manipulable in the sense that
there exist situations in which a judge would benefit from reporting its preferences
insincerely (Proposition 2).3 Finally, we show that the runoff social choice functions
1 A lawmight be “interpreted” in different ways. At a first stage, however, the constitutional court only has
to decide whether the law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional. In the case the law is declared
interpretable, a new stage will start to determine the precise interpretation. In the present paper we do not
study this last stage.
2 The reader is referred to Grofman (2008) for an extensive exposition on runoff methods, their advantages
and disadvantages. See also Fishburn and Brams (1981).
3 See Barberà (2010) for a complete survey on strategy-proofness.
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do not satisfy Maskin-monotonicity; i.e., an alternative that was selected for some
preference profile may disappear from the social choice for another preference profile
even though no alternative has risen in any agent’s preference ranking with respect to
it (Propositions 3).4
The second approach is to analyze runoff voting systems from the point of view
of the implementation theory. In this case, a runoff voting system is interpreted as an
extensive form mechanism in which judges make choices sequentially. Since these
mechanisms induce dynamic games of complete information, we consider subgame
perfect Nash equilibria. We show that, even if we focus on undominated equilibria,
some alternatives which are not Condorcet winners at some preference profiles can be
supported as equilibrium outcomes of the runoff mechanisms. In other words, runoff
voting systems are poormechanisms since they do not implementCondorcet consistent
social choice functions in undominated subgame perfect equilibrium (Proposition 4).
Bag et al. (2009) show a similar result when the domain of preferences is unrestricted.
The present paper illustrates that the problem persists even when we restrict to sin-
gle-peaked preferences, emphasizing the deficiencies of the runoff voting systems.
Our finding, however, does not imply that Condorcet consistent social choice func-
tions are not implementable. We show that other simple voting systems can be used to
achieve this goal. In particular, we prove that some Condorcet consistent social choice
functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via some simple mechanisms in
which each judge only has to announce his most preferred alternative and the median
of these announcements (or a careful selection from the medians, if there are more
than one) is selected (Proposition 5). This is an additional argument against runoff
mechanisms since, in general, implementation in dominant strategies is a much more
difficult task than implementation in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Our last result is not obvious since, in fact, not every Condorcet consistent social
choice function is implementable in dominant strategies.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides definitions, Sect. 3 states the
results, and Sect. 4 concludes.
2 The model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of n ≥ 3 agentswho have to jointly decidewhether a law
is constitutional (alternative a), interpretable (alternative b), or unconstitutional (alter-
native c). Let X = {a, b, c} be the ordered set of alternatives (the order is a > b > c).
General elements of N are denoted by i , j , etc., and general elements of X are denoted
by x , y, etc.
A strict preference relation for agent i , Pi , is single-peaked if there is an alternative,
called peak and denoted by p(Pi ), such that, if y < x < p(Pi ) or p(Pi ) > x > y,
then x Pi y. Each agent i ∈ N has a strict and single-peaked preference relation, Pi ,
defined over X . For this case, this amounts to say that the admissible preferences for i
over X are those represented in Table 1 (higher alternatives in the table are preferred
to lower alternatives).
4 See Maskin (1999).
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Table 1 Admissible
preferences for the agents P
a Pba Pbc Pc
a b b c
b a c b
c c a a
In other words, we suppose that if the most preferred alternative for an agent is
to declare the law constitutional, then to declare the law unconstitutional is his less
preferred alternative, and vice versa. Let P = {Pa, Pba, Pbc, Pc} be the set admissi-
ble preference relations, and let P ≡ (Pi )i∈N ∈ Pn be a preference profile for agents
in N . A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Pn → X that, for each pro-
file P ∈ Pn , selects one and only one alternative f (P) ∈ X . A SCF represents the
objectives of a social planner.
In this paper, we consider SCFs that satisfy Condorcet consistency. For a given
preference profile P ∈ Pn and alternatives x, y ∈ X , let S(P; x, y) be the number
of agents who prefer alternative x to alternative y in the profile P; i.e., S(P; x, y) =
#{i ∈ N : x Pi y}. An alternative x is a Condorcet winner at the preference profile P
iff S(P; x, y) ≥ S(P; y, x) for all y ∈ X\{x}. That is, an alternative is a Condorcet
winner if it is not defeated by any other alternative in majority comparisons. Although
in general a Condorcet winner may not exist, once we restrict to single-peaked pref-
erences, it does. Furthermore, the Condorcet winner may not be unique.5
Definition 1 ASCF f is Condorcet consistent if it only chooses Condorcet winners;
i.e., for all P ∈ Pn , f (P) is a Condorcet winner.
In many situations the social planner cannot directly achieve the outcomes recom-
mended by the SCF f (for instance, he may be unaware of the preferences of the
agents). To obtain the alternatives prescribed by f in a decentralized way, the social
planner must design a mechanism which implements it. A normal form mechanism
is a pair  ≡ (M, g), where M = ×i∈N Mi , Mi is a message or strategy set for agent
i , and g : M → X is an outcome function. A normal form mechanism induces a dif-
ferent game for each preference profile P ∈ Pn . Let (, P) denote the game induced
by the normal form mechanism  at P . Let E be a game theoretic solution concept
(for instance, dominant strategies or Nash equilibrium).6 Given the game (, P), let
E(, P) be the set of strategy profiles that are E -equilibrium in the game (, P).
Definition 2 A normal form mechanism  ≡ (M, g) implements a SCF f in E
equilibrium if, for each P ∈ Pn :
(i) there exists m ∈ E(, P) such that g(m) = f (P), and
5 For example, if n is even, the preferences of n2 agents are P
a , and the preferences of n2 agents are P
c ,
then a, b, and c are Condorcet winners.
6 The strategy profile m ∈ M is a dominant strategy equilibrium of  ≡ (M, g) at P ∈ Pn if, for all
i ∈ N , mˆi ∈ Mi , and mˆ−i ∈ M−i , g(mi , mˆ−i ) Ri g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) (where Ri means “at least as preferred
as”; in particular, if g(mi , mˆ−i ) = g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) then i is indifferent between g(mi , mˆ−i ) and g(mˆi , mˆ−i )).
Similarly, m ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium of at P if for all i ∈ N and mˆi ∈ Mi , g(mi , m−i ) Ri g(mˆi , m−i ).
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(ii) if m ∈ M is such that g(m) = f (P), then m /∈ E(, P).
If such a mechanism exists, then f is E-implementable.
An extensive form mechanism is a dynamic mechanism in which agents make
choices sequentially. Given a game theoretic equilibrium concept, Definition 2 is nat-
urally extended to deal with implementation via extensive form mechanisms.7
Next, we define two properties that are related to the implementability of a SCF.
Definition 3 ASCF f satisfies strategy-proof iff, for all P ∈ Pn , i ∈ N , and Pˆi ∈ P,
f (P) Pi f (Pˆi , P−i ).
Roughly speaking, a SCF is strategy-proof if, in the direct mechanism associated
with it, truth-telling is a dominant strategy.8 The revelation principle (Gibbard 1973)
states that strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for implementation in dominant
strategies.
Definition 4 A SCF f satisfies Maskin-monotonicity when, for all P, Pˆ ∈ Pn , if
f (P) = f (Pˆ) then there exist some i ∈ N and x ∈ X such that f (P) Pi x and x Pˆi
f (P).
Maskin-monotonicity says that if an alternative is selected by f at a given pref-
erence profile P , then it must be also selected for any other preference profile Pˆ
where no alternative has risen in any agent’s preference ranking with respect to it.
Maskin-monotonicity is a necessary condition for the Nash implementability of a SCF
(Maskin 1999). Furthermore, it is a desirable property in itself that can be justified
from a normative point of view.
Consider the runoff voting system as the one used by constitutional courts to decide
whether a law is constitutional, interpretable or unconstitutional. 9
Definition 5 A runoff voting system is a sequential voting system that chooses one
and only one alternative and consists of (at least) two potential rounds:
Round 1: Each agent casts a vote for one alternative. If an alternative wins with a
strict majority of votes, it is chosen and the voting ends. If no alternative wins with a
strict majority of votes and two alternatives win more votes than the other, then go to
Round 2. Ties are broken by a deterministic tie-breaking rule.10
Round 2: The two alternatives winning most votes in Round 1 face off against each
other. If there is not a tie, the alternative that wins more votes is chosen and the voting
ends. Ties are broken by a deterministic tie-breaking rule.11
7 To provide a detailed explanation on this approach would leave us very far, and it is beyond the purpose
of this paper.
8 The direct mechanism associated with a SCF is a normal formmechanism where the message set of each
agent is the set of possible preference relations and the outcome function is the SCF.
9 Moulin (1988) refers to this concept as plurality with runoff.
10 For example, if n = 10, and the votes obtained by a, b, and c are 4, 3, and 3, there not exist “two alterna-
tives winning most votes in Round 1”. Recently, the solution proposed by the President of the Constitutional
Court of Spain for these situations is that the judges vote to break the tie before going to Round 2.
11 In the case of the Constitutional Court of Spain, these ties are broken by the casting vote of the President.
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There is a whole family of runoff voting systems that differ from each other in the
tie-breaking rules, but have in common the skeleton of Definition 5. Let  denote the
family of all runoff voting systems, with typical element r .
Observe that a runoff voting system r ∈  can be interpreted both, as a SCF or as
a mechanism.
Runoff voting systems as SCFs
This approach consists of selecting, for each preference profile P ∈ Pn , that alter-
native that would result in r if all agents voted sincerely. More formally, for each
runoff voting system r ∈  and each preference profile P ∈ Pn , let r(P) ∈ X be
the alternative selected by r at P if all agents voted sincerely. Then, we can define
the runoff SCF associated with r as the function f r : Pn → X such that, for each
P ∈ Pn , f r (P) = r(P).
Example 1 Let n = 10. Consider a preference profile P ∈ Pn such that there are four
voters with preferences Pa , two voters with preferences Pba , and four voters with
preferences Pc. Any runoff voting system r ∈  is such that, if agents vote sincerely
in Stage 1, four agents vote for a, two agents vote for b and four agents vote for c. Then
we go to Stage 2, where only alternatives a and c run. If agents vote sincerely in Stage
2, then six agents vote for a and four agents vote for c. Hence, the SCF associated
with any r ∈  is such that f r (P) = a.
Runoff voting systems as mechanisms
Alternatively to the previous approach, a runoff voting system can be interpreted
as a mechanism in which agents make choices sequentially. According to this inter-
pretation, the mechanism induced by a runoff voting system (runoff mechanism,
hereafter) is an extensive form mechanism that consists of, at least, the two following
stages:
Stage 1: Agents simultaneously vote for one of the alternatives.
1.1 If there is one alternative x that receives more than 50% of votes, then x is chosen.
STOP.
1.2 If no alternative receives more than 50% of votes and two of the alternatives,
x and y, receive more votes than the other, z, then proceed to Stage 2.
Stage 2. Alternatives x and y of Stage 1.2 are faced off against each other. Agents
simultaneously vote for one of the two alternatives. If there is not a tie, the alternative
that receives more votes is chosen. STOP.
Stages 1 and 2 do not cover all possible contingencies. They make up the common
structure of all runoff mechanisms. The cases that are not covered by Stages 1 and 2
will differ depending of the particular runoff voting system considered (different run-
off voting systems will induce different mechanisms). Let G() denote the family of
all runoff mechanisms, with typical element G ∈ G().
In the next section we analyze the properties of the runoff voting systems in their
twofold interpretation: runoff SCFs and runoff mechanisms.
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3 The results
3.1 Runoff SCFs
We first focus on the properties of the runoff SCFs. It is known that, for preference
domains larger than the one analyzed in the present paper, the SCFs defined in this
way have several drawbacks. We show that, unfortunately, many of these problems
remain even when we consider our simple domain, with only three alternatives and
single-peaked preferences. We highlight three of these drawbacks. First, we show that
runoff SCFs do not always select the Condorcet winner.
Proposition 1 There is no runoff voting system r ∈  such that f r is Condorcet
consistent.
Proof Consider Example 1 of the previous section. Alternative b is the only Condorcet
winner at P (an absolute majority of the agents prefer b to a and b to c). However,
f r (P) = a for all r ∈ . unionsq
Next we show that runoff SCFs are not strategy-proof.
Proposition 2 There is no runoff voting system r ∈  such that f r is strategy-proof.
Proof Let n = 9. Let P ∈ Pn be such that there are three voters with preferences
Pa , two voters with preferences Pbc, and four voters with preferences Pc. Then,
f r (P) = c for all r ∈ . Let i ∈ N be one of the voters of type Pa (i.e., Pi = Pa)
and let Pˆi = Pbc. Then, for all r ∈ , b = f r (Pˆi , P−i ) Pi f r (P) = c, which
contradicts strategy-proofness. unionsq
Finally, we show that runoff SCFs are not Maskin-monotonic.
Proposition 3 There is no runoff voting system r ∈  such that f r is Maskin-
monotonic.
Proof Consider Example 1 of the previous section. We have that f r (P) = a for all
r ∈ . Let Pˆ ∈ Pn be such that there are four voters with preferences Pa , two voters
with preferences Pba , two voters with preferences Pbc and two voters with prefer-
ences Pc (i.e., the only difference between P and Pˆ is that two voters change their
preferences from Pc to Pbc). Then, f r (Pˆ) = b for all r ∈ . However, for all i ∈ N
and x ∈ X such that a Pi x , we have a Pˆi x , which contradicts Maskin-monotonicity.
unionsq
3.2 Runoff mechanisms
Since the mechanisms in G() induce dynamic games of complete information, we
will consider subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPE).12
12 For each extensive formmechanism and each preference profile, a subgame perfect equilibrium induces
a Nash equilibrium in every subgame (see Moore and Repullo 1988; Abreu and Sen 1990).
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A common problem of many voting systems is that, in the mechanisms induced by
them, any alternative can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. For example, let
P ∈ Pn be such that Pi = Pa for all i ∈ N ; i.e., all agents have the same preferences
a Pi b Pi c. Given any runoff mechanism, G ∈ G(), one can always find a profile of
strategies that are a SPE of the mechanism at P where all agents vote for alternative
c in Stage 1.13 Obviously, such profile of SPE strategies results in c.
Not all SPE are equally appealing. For instance, in Stage 1 of the previous example
the agents are voting for their worst alternative c. This implies that they are using a
dominated strategy.14 In particular, in that example, no matter what the other agents
do, each agent i would be at least as well voting for a than voting for c in Stage 1,
and for some announcements of the other agents, i would be strictly better announc-
ing a than announcing c. Because of the previous comment, we will only consider
undominated SPE.15
The restriction to undominated SPE prevents from some equilibrium outcomes.
This, however, does not avoid the possibility of supporting as equilibrium outcomes
some alternatives which are not Condorcet winners at some preference profiles, which
implies that this mechanism does not implement any Condorcet consistent SCF.
Proposition 4 Let f : Pn → X be a Condorcet consistent SCF. Let G ∈ G() be a
runoff mechanism. Then, G does not implement f in undominated SPE.
Proof Let P ∈ Pn be such that Pi = Pa for all i ∈ N (i.e., a Pi b Pi c for all i ∈ N ).
Given a mechanism G ∈ G(), consider a profile of strategies of that mechanism
such that, for each i ∈ N : (1) in Stage 1 agent i votes for his second best alternative,
b, and (2) in every proper subgame beginning in Stage 2, (2.1) if a and b are faced off
against each other, agent i votes for a, (2.2) if a and c are faced off against each other,
agent i votes for a, and (2.3) if b and c are faced off against each other, agent i votes
for b.
We show that, for any mechanism G ∈ G(), we can always find a profile of
strategies for the agents satisfying the two previous conditions that constitutes an
undominated SPE of G at P .
Of course, Points (1) and (2) do not completely specify the strategy for agent i .
The complete description of the strategy must include the actions of the agent in
those contingencies that change with the particular mechanism G ∈ G() considered
(i.e., contingencies that change with the particular runoff voting system considered).
13 Since the profile of strategies is a SPE, it must be such that in every proper subgame beginning at Stage
2 each agent votes for his most preferred alternative x or y. We have not specified the complete profile of
strategies since the rest of contingencies will depend on the particular mechanism. In any case, for each
mechanism M ∈ M(), one can always define the rest of the strategy profile in such a way that it is a SPE.
In particular, the proposed profile is a Nash equilibrium of the whole game because c is selected in Stage 1
and no unilateral deviation can change this result.
14 A strategy is dominated if no matter what the rest of agents do, there is some other strategy that does
equally well and sometimes strictly better.
15 A profile of strategies is an undominated SPE if it is a SPE and no strategy is dominated at any subgame.
A mechanism M ∈ M() implements a SCF f in undominated SPE if, for each P ∈ Pn , (i) there exists an
undominated subgame perfect equilibrium of the mechanism that results in f (P), and (ii) there does not
exist any undominated subgame perfect equilibrium that results in some alternative different from f (P).
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Given a mechanism G ∈ G(), the complete description of the strategy can always
be specified in such a way that the resulting profile of strategies constitutes a Nash
equilibrium at P in every subgame different from the whole game and from those
subgames beginning in Stage 2, and no strategy is weakly dominated in any of these
subgames at P .
Hence, it only remains to prove that any profile of strategies satisfying Points (1)
and (2) above is such that, in the game induced by G at P: (i) it is a Nash equilibrium
of the whole game, (ii) it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame that begins in
Stage 2, (iii) no strategy is weakly dominated in the whole game, and (iv) no strategy
is dominated in any subgame that begins in Stage 2.
The fact that any profile of strategies satisfying Points (1) and (2) is a Nash equi-
librium of the whole game is clear: since all agents are voting for b, this alternative
is selected in Stage 1 and no unilateral deviation can change this result. The fact that
such profile of strategies induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame that begins in
Stage 2 and no strategy is dominated in any of these subgames is also clear: in these
subgames the agents only can vote for one of two alternatives and all of them vote for
the same alternative, namely the one which they prefer most.
Finally, we prove that any strategy satisfying Points (1) and (2) is not weakly dom-
inated in the whole game.
Claim 1 If Pi = Pa , a strategy where i votes for a in Stage 1 never dominates in the
whole game a strategy satisfying Points (1) and (2).
For sake of simplicity, let us suppose that n = 9. Let P ∈ Pn be such that there are
three voters with preferences Pa (agent i is included in this group), two voters with
preferences Pbc, and four voters with preferences Pc. Suppose that the strategy of any
agent j = i is such that, (i) in Stage 1 he votes for his most preferred alternative and,
(ii) in any proper subgame beginning in Stage 2, between the two alternatives that are
faced off, he votes for the one he prefers most. Suppose first that agent i’s strategy is
such that he votes for a in Stage 1. Then three agents vote for a, two agents vote for b,
and four agents vote for c in Stage 1. Hence, we move to Stage 2 where alternatives a
and c are faced off against each other and, given the strategies for all agents other than
i , alternative c is chosen, no matters what i does (since the two voters with preferences
Pbc and the four voters with preferences Pc vote for c). Suppose now that agent i’s
strategy satisfies Points (1) and (2). Then, i votes for b in Stage 1. Then, two agents
vote for a, three agents vote for b, and four agents vote for c in Stage 1. Hence, we
move to Stage 2 where alternatives b and c are faced off against each other and, given
the strategies of all agents, alternative b is chosen (five agents vote for b and four
agents vote for c). Since b Pi c, the proposed strategies for all j = i are such that
agent i is better off following a strategy that satisfies Points (1) and (2) than following
any strategy where he votes for a in Stage 1.
Claim 2 If Pi = Pa , a strategy where i votes for c in Stage 1 never dominates in the
whole game a strategy satisfying Points (1) and (2).
This claim follows from the fact that c is the worst alternative for agent i . We omit
its proof in the interest of brevity.
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The fact that there exists a profile of strategies satisfying Points (1) and (2) that
constitutes an undominated SPE of G at P implies that G does not implement f in
undominated SPE, since that profile will result in b, which is not a Condorcet winner
at P . unionsq
Bag et al. (2009) prove a similar result for the case in which the preferences are not
restricted to be single-peaked. Since our domain of preferences is smaller, Proposi-
tion 4 cannot be deduced from their result. As in Bag et al. (2009), here the violation
of Condorcet consitency is mostly due to the possible elimination of more than one
alternative in the first round.
The bad properties of runoff mechanisms are beyond not delivering the Condorcet
winner. They also violate Pareto-efficiency. To see this, note that the preference pro-
file P proposed in the proof of Proposition 4 is such that, even although there is an
alternative, a, that is unanimously preferred by all agents to any other alternative, the
second best alternative, b, can be supported as an undominated SPE. Therefore, the
SCFs that are actually implemented by the runoff mechanisms violate unanimity and,
hence, are not Pareto-efficient either.16
The fact that runoff voting systems do not implement Condorcet consistent SCFs
in undominated SPE does not imply that Condorcet consistent SCFs are not imple-
mentable. Our next proposition shows that some Condorcet consistent SCFs can be
implemented in dominant strategies via simple mechanisms.
For each P ∈ Pn , an alternative x ∈ X is a median of the peaks if #{i ∈ N :
p(Pi ) ≥ x} ≥ n2 and #{i ∈ N : x ≥ p(Pi )} ≥ n2 (given the order a > b > c).17
Since in our model, preferences are restricted to be single-peaked relative to the order
a > b > c, the median of the peaks relative to this order are the Condorcet winners.
In our context, the median of the peaks may not be unique. This implies that there are
several Condorcet consistent SCFs. We prove that some of them are implementable
in dominant strategies via a simple mechanism.
Before showing this result, let us note that, if there are more than one median,
alternative b must be one of them. In other words, the possible sets of median of the
peaks are {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {b, c}, and {a, b, c}. For each P ∈ Pn , let med(P) be
the set of the median of the peaks. Let f ∗ : Pn → X be the Condorcet consistent SCF
that selects b when there are several Condorcet winners; i.e., for each P ∈ Pn ,
f ∗(P) =
{
med(P); if med(P) is unique
b; otherwise
Let ∗ = (M, g) be the normal form mechanism such that:
16 Runoff mechanisms have at least one good property: no Condorcet loser can be sustained as an equilib-
rium (an alternative is a Condorcet loser if can be defeated in pairwise comparisons by any other alternative).
17 For example, if n = 10 and P ∈ Pn is such that five agents have their peaks in a, one agent has his
peak in b, and four agents have their peaks in c, then both a and b are medians of the peaks. If Pˆ ∈ Pn is
such that five agents have their peaks in a and five agents have their peaks in c, then all the alternatives, a,
b, and c, are medians of the peaks.
123
SERIEs (2012) 3:1–14 11
– For each i ∈ N , Mi = {a, b, c}; i.e., each agent only has to announce one
alternative. For each m ∈ M , let med(m) be the set of the median of the announce-
ments {m1, m2, . . . , mn} relative to the order a > b > c.18
– The outcome function g : M → X is such that, for each m ∈ M :
g(m) =
{
med(m); if med(m) is unique
b; otherwise
Mechanism ∗ is a simplified version of the direct mechanism associated with
f ∗ where each agent only has to announce his most preferred alternative (instead of
having to announce his whole preference relation).
Proposition 5 Mechanism ∗ implements in dominant strategies the Condorcet con-
sistent SCF f ∗.
Proof Claim 1 For each P ∈ Pn and i ∈ N , mi = p(Pi ) is a dominant strategy of
∗ at P for agent i .
Case 1.1 Suppose that p(Pi ) = a. Then Pi = Pa . Suppose by contradiction that
mi = a is not a dominant strategy for i . Then, there exists some mˆi = a and some
mˆ−i ∈ M−i such that g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) Pa g(a, mˆ−i ). Since a Pa b Pa c, we have that
either g(a, mˆ−i ) = b or g(a, mˆ−i ) = c. If g(a, mˆ−i ) = b, then g(m˜i , mˆ−i ) = a
for all m˜i ∈ Mi , and therefore g(a, mˆ−i ) Ra g(mˆi , mˆ−i ). If g(a, mˆ−i ) = c, then
g(m˜i , mˆ−i ) = c for all m˜i ∈ Mi , and therefore g(a, mˆ−i ) Pa g(mˆi , mˆ−i ).
Case 1.2 Suppose that p(Pi ) = b. Then either Pi = Pba or Pi = Pbc. Suppose
by contradiction that there exists some mˆi = b and some mˆ−i ∈ M−i such that
g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) Pba g(b, mˆ−i ) or g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) Pbc g(b, mˆ−i ). Since b Pba a Pba c and b
Pbc c Pbc a, we have that either g(b, mˆ−i ) = a or g(b, mˆ−i ) = c. If g(b, mˆ−i ) = a
then g(m˜i , mˆ−i ) = a for all m˜i ∈ Mi , and therefore g(b, mˆ−i ) Rba g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) and
g(b, mˆ−i ) Rbc g(mˆi , mˆ−i ). If g(b, mˆ−i ) = c then g(m˜i , mˆ−i ) = c for all m˜i ∈ Mi ,
and therefore g(b, mˆ−i ) Rba g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) and g(b, mˆ−i ) Rbc g(mˆi , mˆ−i ).
Case 1.3 Suppose that p(Pi ) = c. Then Pi = Pc. Suppose by contradiction that there
exists some mˆi = c and some mˆ−i ∈ M−i such that g(mˆi , mˆ−i ) Pc g(c, mˆ−i ). Since
c Pc b Pc a, we have that either g(c, mˆ−i ) = b or g(c, mˆ−i ) = a. If g(c, mˆ−i ) = b,
then g(m˜i , mˆ−i ) = c for all m˜i ∈ Mi , and therefore g(c, mˆ−i ) Rc g(mˆi , mˆ−i ). If
g(c, mˆ−i ) = a, then g(m˜i , mˆ−i ) = a for all m˜i ∈ Mi , and therefore g(c, mˆ−i ) Pc
g(mˆi , mˆ−i ).
Claim 2 For each P ∈ Pn , i ∈ N , and mi = p(Pi ), we have that mi is not a dominant
strategy of ∗ at P for agent i .
Suppose for simplicity that n = 10.
18 That is, med(m) is the median of the peaks when the preference profile P ∈ Pn is such that p(Pi ) = mi
for all i ∈ N .
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Case 2.1 Suppose that p(Pi ) = a. Then Pi = Pa . Let m−i ∈ M−i be such that five
agents announce a and four agents announce b. Then, a = g(a, m−i ) Pa g(b, m−i ) =
b, and hence mi = b is not a dominant strategy of ∗ at P for agent i . Similarly, let
mˆ−i ∈ M−i be such that four agents announce b and five agents announce c. Then,
b = g(a, mˆ−i ) Pa g(c, mˆ−i ) = c, and hence mi = c is not a dominant strategy of ∗
at P for agent i .
Case 2.2 Suppose that p(Pi ) = b. Then either Pi = Pba or Pi = Pbc. Let m−i ∈
M−i be such that five agents announce a and four agents announce b. Then, b =
g(b, m−i ) Pi g(a, m−i ) = a , and hence mi = a is not a dominant strategy of ∗ at
P for agent i . Similarly, let mˆ−i ∈ M−i be such that four agents announce b and five
agents announce c. Then, b = g(b, mˆ−i ) Pi g(c, mˆ−i ) = c, and hence mi = c is not
a dominant strategy of ∗ at P for agent i .
Case 2.3 Suppose that p(Pi ) = c. Then Pi = Pc. Let m−i ∈ M−i be such that five
agents announce a and four agents announce b. Then, b = g(c, m−i ) Pc g(a, m−i ) =
a , and hence mi = a is not a dominant strategy of ∗ at P for agent i . Similarly, let
mˆ−i ∈ M−i be such that four agents announce b and five agents announce c. Then,
c = g(c, mˆ−i ) Pc g(b, mˆ−i ) = b, and hence mi = b is not a dominant strategy of ∗
at P for agent i . unionsq
Not every Condorcet consistent SCF is implementable in dominant strategies. The
following example clarifies this point.




med(P); if med(P) is unique
a; if med(P) = {a, b}
c; if med(P) = {b, c}
b; if med(P) = {a, b, c}
Clearly, fˆ is Condorcet consistent. Suppose that n = 10. Let P ∈ Pn be such
that five agents have preferences Pa , one agent has preferences Pba , and four agents
have preferences Pc. Let i ∈ N be the agent whose preferences are Pba . Note that
b = fˆ (Pc, P−i ) Pba fˆ (Pba, P−i ) = a. In other words, the SCF fˆ is not strategy-
proof. Hence, fˆ is not implementable in dominant strategies (via a mechanism similar
to ∗ or via any other mechanism).
4 Conclusion
The Constitutional Court of Spain uses runoff as voting system to decide whether a
law is constitutional, unconstitutional, or interpretable. It is known that, for universal
domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice
rules. In the setting of this paper, however, the preferences of the judges are restricted
to be single-peaked over three alternatives (i.e., if the most preferred alternative for a
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judge is to declare the law constitutional, then to declare the law unconstitutional is
his less preferred alternative, and vice versa). We show that, unfortunately, this restric-
tion on the domain is not enough to solve the problems of the runoff social choice
rules. Alternatively, runoff voting systems can be analyzed as mechanisms instead
of as social choice rules. Since in our setting there always exist Condorcet winners,
one question that arises naturally if we follow this approach is whether the runoff
mechanisms implement Condorcet consistent social choice rules, and whether there
are other mechanisms that can make this job better. We prove that runoff mechanisms
are not well-behaved: we show that they do not implement Condorcet consistent social
choice rules in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that
some Condorcet consistent functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via
a simple and natural mechanism in which each judge only has to announce one of
the three possible resolutions: constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional. Thus,
this mechanism overtakes the runoff mechanism in terms of the majoritarian approval.
We conclude, therefore, that the rules governing courts deserve more detailed anal-
ysis as some of its procedures may fail at achieving the will of the majority of the
judges.
We see some scope for further development and extension of the model stud-
ied in this paper. In our model, the judges know perfectly well their preferences.
We interpret the situation as follows: The voting procedure of the constitutional
court is a way to aggregate judges’ criteria. Such criteria (which are simply per-
sonal opinions based on experiences, knowledge, and how each judge under-
stands and interprets the constitution) may differ across judges. A different line
of research could involve assuming that there is an objective true about the
law’s constitutionality that the judges are trying to uncover. This approach is
related to de literature dealing with the Condorcet jury theorem (e.g., Austen-
Smith and Banks 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998; Duggan and Martinelli
2001).
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